A detailed, illustrated account of the air campaign that accompanied the Red Army's final push towards Berlin, in which massed Soviet air power defeated the Luftwaffe's high-tech Me 262 jets and Mistel exploding drones. The last months of World War II on the Eastern Front saw a ferocious fight between two very different air forces. Soviet Air Force (VVS) Commander-in-Chief Alexander Novikov assembled 7,500 aircraft in three powerful air armies to support the final assault on Berlin. The Luftwaffe employed some of its most advanced weapons including the Me 262 jet and Mistel remotely-guided bomb aircraft. Using photos, 3D diagrams, maps and battlescene artwork, William E. Hiestand, a military analyst with a longstanding interest in Soviet military history, explains how Germany's use of high-tech weaponry and massed Soviet air assaults was not just the culmination of World War II air combat, but also pointed to how the future rivalry with NATO would play out. The VVS used powerful and flexible air armies to control and employ its huge force of aircraft – organizational and employment concepts that would shape Soviet plans and preparations for combat during the Cold War. For the first time, this volume explains how air power helped win the war on the Eastern Front, and how victory shaped Soviet air power doctrine for the decades to come.

Examines Eighth Army's 1,000-strong tank force - rebuilt, reorganized, and equipped with brand-new Sherman and Churchill tanks - that secured victory at the Second Battle of El Alamein. When Eighth Army retired into the defensive line at El Alamein on 30 June 1942, it was tired, dispirited and had lost almost all its tanks during a string of defeats at Gazala, Tobruk and Mersa Matruh. After savage defensive fighting at First Alamein, the reinforced Desert Rats defeated Rommel's last offensive in a tank-to-tank clash at Alam Halfa in September. The next month, a completely rebuilt and reorganized Eighth Army, equipped with over 1,000 tanks including the American M4 Sherman, launched the offensive that would finally drive Rommel out of Africa. Montgomery shaped the Eighth Army according to his own military ideas, and on 23 October was able to attack the Axis defenses with the largest force of armoured divisions in its history, with the 1st, 8th and 10th united in a new 'corps de chasse' intended to defeat the Afrika Korps at its own game, and the 7th and two infantry support tank brigades assigned to support the XXX and XIII Corps. With the exception of the A9, 10 and 13 cruisers of 1940-41, as the offensive began, the Eighth Army contained every type of tank employed during the North Africa campaign. Using detailed illustrations of the tanks involved with an analysis of the tactics employed for battle, this is a focused examination of the tank forces that won the Second Battle of El Alamein - the most famous British Army victory of World War II, and one of the turning points of the war.

The story of what really led to Germany losing the battle of Stalingrad - the inability of the Luftwaffe to keep Sixth Army supplied throughout the winter of 1942-43 - and why this crucial airlift failed. Luftwaffe chief Hermann Goering's failure to deliver his promise to keep Sixth Army supplied at Stalingrad was one of the most hard-hitting strategic air failures of World War II. 300 tons a day of supplies were required to sustain the Sixth Army, flown in against a Soviet fighter force whose capabilities were rapidly being transformed. The Luftwaffe's failure left Sixth Army trapped, vulnerable and too weak to attempt a breakout. The destruction of Sixth Army was one of the major turning points in World War II but the Luftwaffe's crucial role in this disaster has often been overlooked. Some claim the attempt was doomed from the beginning but, in this intriguing book, author William E. Hiestand explains how the Germans had amassed sufficient aircraft to, at least theoretically, provide the supplies needed. Demands of aircraft maintenance, awful weather and, in particular, the Soviet air blockade crippled the airlift operation. In addition, the employment of increasing numbers of modern aircraft by the Soviet Air Force using more flexible tactics, coupled with Chief Marshal Novikov's superior Air Army organisation proved decisive. The Luftwaffe did eventually recover and mounted focused operations for control of limited areas of the Eastern Front, but overall it had lost its dominance. Packed with strategic diagrams and maps, archive photos and artwork of aerial battles over Stalingrad, and including bird's eye views of Operation Winter Storm and airlift operations and tactics, this title clearly demonstrates how the Luftwaffe lost its strategic initiative in the air.

This study explains how the armies of North and South Vietnam, newly equipped with the most modern Soviet and US tanks and weaponry, fought the decisive armored battles of the Easter Offensive. Wearied by years of fighting against Viet Cong guerillas and North Vietnamese regulars, the United States had almost completely withdrawn its forces from Vietnam by early 1972. Determined to halt the expansion and improvement of South Vietnamese forces under the U.S. "Vietnamization" program, North Vietnam launched a major fourteen-division attack in March 1972 against the South that became known as the "Easter Offensive." Hanoi's assault was spearheaded by 1,200 tanks and was counteracted on the opposite side by Saigon's newly equipped armored force using U.S. medium tanks. The result was ferocious fighting between major Cold War-era U.S. and Soviet tanks and mechanized equipment, pitting M-48 medium and M-41 light tanks against their T- 54 and PT-76 rivals in a variety of combat environments ranging from dense jungle to urban terrain. Both sides employed cutting-edge weaponry for the first time, including the U.S. TOW and Soviet 9M14 Malyutk wire-guided anti-tank missiles. This volume examines the tanks, armored forces and weapons that clashed in this little-known campaign in detail, using after-action reports from the battlefield and other primary sources to analyze the technical and organizational factors that shaped the outcome. Despite the ARVN's defensive success in October 1972, North Vietnam massively expanded its armor forces over the next two years while U.S. support waned. This imbalance with key strategic misjudgments by the South Vietnamese President led to the stunning defeat of the South in 1975 when T54 tanks crashed through the fence surrounding the Presidential palace and took Saigon on 30 April 1975.

A new illustrated study of the devastating, but little-known, Soviet armored blitzkrieg against the Japanese in the last weeks of World War II, and how it influenced Soviet tank doctrine as the Cold War dawned. Although long overshadowed in the West by the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the USSR's lightning strike into Manchuria in August 1945 was one of the most successful and unique campaigns of the era. Soviet forces, led by over 5,500 tanks and self-propelled guns, attacked across huge distances and deserts, marshes, and mountains to smash Japan's million-strong Kwantung Army in a matter of days. Japanese forces were short of training and equipment, but nevertheless fought fiercely, inflicting 32,000 casualties on the Soviets. Red Army operations were characterized by surprise, speed, and deep penetrations by tank-heavy forces born of the brutal lessons they had learned during years fighting the Wehrmacht. Lessons from the campaign directly shaped Soviet Cold War force structure and planning for mechanized operations against the West. Illustrated with contemporary artwork and rare photos from one of the best collections of Soviet military photos in the West, this fascinating book explains exactly how the last blitzkrieg of World War II was planned, fought, and won, and how it influenced the Red Army's plans for tank warfare against NATO in Europe.